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"warum ich-diesen mißbrachten Satz schuf": Ways of Reading Nietzsche in the Light of *KGW IX*

**MARTIN ENDRES AND AXEL PICHLER**

**ABSTRACT**: When examining Nietzsche’s Nachlass from 1885-89, international Nietzsche scholarship still predominantly relies on the Colli/Montinari edition of these writings (the “Nachgelassene Fragmente”), even though a new historico-critical edition of the Nachlass that fulfills the standards of current textual criticism is being published since 2001: *KGW IX*. In this article we want to outline the philological considerations that led to this new critical edition with its “diplomatic transcription” of Nietzsche’s late “manuscripts.” In a second step, we demonstrate the consequences of *KGW IX* for the interpretation of Nietzsche’s Nachlass and his late published writings. It is our aim to show that the complexity of Nietzsche’s writing in his sketches and drafts from 1885-89 makes any philosophical approach untenable that ignores this complexity—at least under a philological perspective.

**Introduction**

No lesser personage than Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, rejecting Karl Schlechta’s emphasis on “prudence,” due to the dominating use of the subjunctive (Konjunktiv) that characterizes the entire aphorism, writes in his interpretation of the oft-cited introduction of the “will to power” in *BGE* 36 (cf. *KSA* 5, pp. 54–55) that it would be wrong “to interpret a stylistic device as means of objective distancing from the main point.” Müller-Lauter supports this hypothesis by comparing the published aphorism with a putative earlier version of it from the Nachlass (cf. *KSA* 11:38[12], pp. 610–11), in which Nietzsche expresses himself “with unambiguous determination,” and concludes that “when it comes to the elaboration of Nietzsche’s last ‘insights,’... then, the unpublished text, which is a ‘preliminary stage’ ['Vorstufe’], should take—as in other cases for other reasons—interpretable precedence over the published version.”

The thesis that Nietzsche’s Nachlass has to be given preference philosophically over the published writings and that the form(s) of presentation have to be subordinated to the philosophical content—a view that has been held by some of the most famous interpreters of Nietzsche, including Martin Heidegger, Arthur Danto, Richard Schacht, Günter Abel, and Volker Gerhardt—has been regularly contradicted. A strong objection to this view has been put forth by Claus Zittel in his article on Nietzsche’s Nachlass in the *Nietzsche-Handbuch*. Zittel writes:

> Basically it should be noted that N. formulated his ideas more thematically in the “Nachlass,” which enticed many scholars to reconstruct “final doctrines” out of the isolated notes and to turn these into dogmas. In the published work these supposed doctrines appear, if they do so at all, aesthetically contextualized and are thus mostly expressed ironically and disjointedly and are undermined in many ways... Here N. writes hypothetically, ambiguously, and with complexity; he makes use of numerous allusions and references, by which the individual thoughts are arranged in a complex web of relationships... Therefore the published writings possess, qua form, a higher degree of reflectivity than the posthumous sketches [Aufzeichnungen].

In this article we would like to follow up on the controversy resulting from these two views—which presents any interpreter of Nietzsche with a general decision—because it serves as an entrée into the historical background of the practices of Nietzsche’s editors as much as to the question about the importance and relevance of the new edition of Nietzsche’s Nachlass from the period 1885–1889, or *KGW IX*, as scholars usually call this edition, after the section it occupies in the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, for suitably interpreting Nietzsche. Accordingly, this article is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, which offers an initial assessment of the importance of *KGW IX* for the interpretation of a single work of Nietzsche—*Beyond Good and Evil*—by examining the textual genesis of the famous aphorism 36, we give a synopsis of the historical and theoretical background that led to the new edition of Nietzsche’s late Nachlass. We then provide a close reading of a manuscript documented in *KGW IX* and offer a proposal for how to philosophically handle the philological status of the writings not published by Nietzsche himself. The last section of the article is dedicated to the question of how the newly transcribed drafts (Entwürfe), which afterward were partially incorporated into the published versions of Nietzsche’s writings, can be used for an analysis of the textual genesis of these “final” texts.

The new edition’s importance for addressing the question of whether the Nachlass or the published writings are of greater value for an understanding of Nietzsche’s thought lies in the fact that this edition offers a third approach that takes the status of the published writings just as seriously as it takes the late Nachlass with its highly specific characteristics. While the ‘dispute’ between Müller-Lauter and Zittel revives the quarrel, well known since Plato’s *Gorgias*, between philosophy understood as a superior science and rhetoric as a systematic investigation of the particular in language, *KGW IX*’s “diplomatic
transcription" allows an alternative approach to Nietzsche's Nachlass. This approach makes it possible to retrace the formation of the published writings by following the textual witnesses (Textzeugen) and thereby also to exploit the meanings layered into the evolutionary history of texts.

Due to the exceptional individuality that can be reconstructed on the basis of the "topology" ("Topo-Logik") of handwriting, Nietzsche's drafts possess an intangible added value that distinguishes them from the printed text. On the other hand, this added value is potentially undermined by the fact that Nietzsche's preliminary stages (Vorstufen) are handwritten texts and therefore differ from the printed versions by their clearly unfinished character, unless they are a final copy (Reinschrift). According to Ludwig Jäger, precisely this aspect—the openness to "transcriptive processing"—characterizes unpublished handwritten documents.

Of course, such an approach had already been possible for Nietzsche researchers before the release of KGW IX. Without it, however, a genetic reading was not easily achieved. For example, to reconstruct the textual genesis of BGE 36, one would have either had to visit the archive in Weimar to examine the textual witnesses (Textzeugen) there directly or commit oneself to the exhausting and—owing to the incompleteness of the Nachbericht, the commentary volumes that list corrections to the volumes of the KGW—only partially possible reconstruction of the text's genesis with the help of this volume's philological apparatus.

In the case of BGE 36, this is of even greater significance, because the record, whose importance is emphasized by Müller-Lauter (sketch, KSA 11:38[12], pp. 610–11), emerged from the revision of an even earlier version. This earlier version was not included in the commentary of KSA and until the publication of KGW IX was only available through the Nachbericht of KGW VII, which was published in 1986 (KGW VII/4.2, p. 469). This text can be found on pages 94 and 95 of notebook W 13, which Nietzsche used in spring and summer 1885 and then again in early 1886 and whose diplomatic transcription is now published in the fourth volume of KGW IX (see fig. 1a/b). A look at these pages shows the additional possibilities of this draft (Entwurf)/sketch (Aufzeichnung) to clarify the understanding of the text published by Colli and Montinari, because the earlier draft allows us to follow the genesis of the text later published in BGE. This does not mean that the published text would not be accessible by itself but only that by the inclusion of earlier versions genetically related to the text further elements of significance can be assigned to it. These additional meanings do—depending on their own content—contribute to the interpretation of the published text by shaping it even more.

As important is the fact that this very sketch is not—as it was claimed by Müller-Lauter—a Vorstufe of BGE 36 in a strict sense but only distantly related to the later published version, owing to the fact that Nietzsche used and revised parts of the sketch that was ultimately published as KSA 11:38[12] (pp. 610–11; cf. Nachbericht to KGW IX/9, p. 70) once again after dictating it but after doing so never used it again.
Before we turn to show how textual witnesses (Textzeugen) can be made fruitful for philosophical interpretation, we still have to answer the questions why Nietzsche’s Nachlass was not published in such a form until the beginning of this millennium and what criteria this new edition follows.

Synopsis of the Historical and Theoretical Background of KGW IX

The history of the falsification of Nietzsche’s texts up until the 1960s is well known and needs not be rehashed. Much less familiar is the problematic status caused by some basic editorial decisions underlying the Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke, which was launched in 1967 by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, as well as the Kritische Studienausgabe, based on this edition, which the majority of Nietzsche scholars still uncritically see as the philologically proper basis of their interpretative work. In 1982, Montinari formulated one of his main editorial goals, namely, that “the handwritten Nachlass . . . be published in its authentic form.” As Davide Giuriato and Sandro Zanetti have convincingly demonstrated, developments in textual criticism since Montinari’s death in 1986 have called into question the supposition of an “authentic form”:

Montinari’s editorial practice in his attempt to reconstruct Nietzsche’s records in chronological order had relied on questionable categories, through which Nietzsche’s scarcely legible notes, sketches [Aufzeichnungen], and drafts [Entwürfe] were turned into linearized texts in forms such as “preliminary stages” [“Vorstufen”] and fragments. The constitution of the texts of Nietzsche’s sketches was thereby based on an interpretational scheme that could not satisfy the demands of making the “authentic . . . form” of these writings accessible.

The problems in KGW VII and VIII addressed here had already been outlined in 1995 by Wolfram Groddeck and Michael Kohlenbach and were examined in a more systematic manner in 2007 in a Nietzsche-Studien article by Beat Röllin and René Stockmar. Their critiques are based on the development of editorial sciences in recent decades. Scholars such as Gunter Martens, Wolfram Groddeck, and Roland Reuß in particular have contributed to these developments. One point of agreement among the otherwise strongly divergent views of these authors is that “the reproduction of the handwriting in the typological set is, even with the most sophisticated printing design, not a pictorial figure ("mimesis"); it is rather the result of a translation ("interpretatio") from a polymorphic into a stereotyped writing system” (KGW IX/1, p. xv). The printed text thus does not yet exist; even in the case of a diplomatic transcription, it has to be produced: “Text is therefore always already constituted text, that is to say, the moment of unity in literature brought forth with the critical reception and the naiveté of the given is here, as everywhere, especially when it comes to science, out of place.”

In light of this new understanding of textuality, the following editorial decisions by Colli and Montinari have proved particularly problematic:

1. The division of Nietzsche’s writings into text volumes and apparatus volumes. According to Groddeck and Kohlenbach, such a distinction “involuntarily [encourages] a certain direction for both reading and interpretation.” Especially in the case of the so-called posthumous fragments, this editorial practice suggested that what was being presented was a complete, accurate, and chronological edition of the Nachlass: “Consecutively numbered and in a strict chronological order, the posthumous fragments established themselves as a particularly easy-to-quote system, and this with all the authority of a printed book.”
2. The chronological order of the “entire text”/the “posthumous fragments.” This gives the false impression of a temporal precision, “which cannot be justified for all cases with the same evidence.”

3. The linear representation of Nietzsche’s sketches. Failing to draw the now common distinction between clean copies/printed text and handwritten sketches or drafts in editorial theory and practice, Colli and Montinari dared to contrive—as was still common at the time—the linear texts out of handwritten sketches, which falsely gave the impression of unambiguousness. As Groddeck and Kohlenbach put it, this practice led to a situation in which “more ‘Nietzsche texts’ have been published than he actually wrote.”

In summation, this editorial approach promoted the belief that the Colli/Montinari edition was complete and authentic. Especially in regard to authenticity, however, the criteria of German-speaking editorial practice have changed dramatically since the 1970s. Of the current way of treating these kinds of problems, Giuriato and Zanetti state that “authenticity only makes sense in terms of a requirement to disclose underlying presentation principles, as well as the precise documentation of the given material.”

The editors of KGWIX fulfill precisely these requirements by providing facsimiles of the originals as well as a reproduction of the sketches from Nietzsche’s late Nachlass that has been integrated into a differentiated transcription, which thus maintains the specific character of the handwritten as a sketch: “Because KGWIX documents the late Nachlass in the manner described, it remains readily apparent that the sketches and writing processes do not constitute a linear reading text: the complexity and contextuality of these sketches is clearly evident.”

We briefly demonstrate the consequences of these editorial practices for the reading of Nietzsche’s texts. We proceed in two steps. First, given the popular distinction between sketches and linear (printed) text in editorial theory and practice, we offer a close reading of a set of sketches in notepad N VII 2. Second, we return to the textual genesis of the famous aphorism 36 of Beyond Good and Evil by looking at the putative earlier version of this same aphorism—the sketch that can be found on pages 94 and 95 of notebook W I 3. Here we briefly outline the significance of this sketch for dealing with Nietzsche’s supposedly central “doctrine” of the “will to power” and for assessing its importance in Beyond Good and Evil.

N VII 2, p. 153: The Self-Referentiality and Self-Reflexivity of Writing

Conscious of the problems involved in “inventing” a clearly continuous and linear text, we now turn to an analysis of one page of Nietzsche’s notebook N VII 2 (KGWIX/2). A close reading of the page shows the deep complexity and internal references that Nietzsche’s sketches exhibit. Along with this analysis, we offer a more appropriate methodology for reading the surviving manuscripts and at the same time outline the criteria and particularities of this method that distinguish it from more conventional interpretations of texts.

Though this may seem strange, it is of vital importance for a reading such as the one we wish to summarize here that initially avoids any interpolations or philosophical presuppositions. Such presuppositions must be set aside as far as possible to prevent us from fulfilling Nietzsche’s prophecy in Ecce homo, “No one [can] get more out of things, including books, than he already knows” (“Niemand [kann] aus den Dingen, die Bücher eingerechnet, mehr heraushören, als er bereits weiss”) (EH “Books,” 1; KSA 6, pp. 299–300).

By no means does such a philological reading require shelving established interpretations of Nietzsche as textually unfounded. Yet a precise and careful philological reading offers a textually firmer basis for making general statements about Nietzsche’s philosophy in the Nachlass. However, such a philological reading is in no way easy—on the contrary, constant reflections on the meaning of the form and the materiality of the written word requires both a high degree of sensitivity and an ongoing scrutiny of one’s own conditions of understanding and comprehension. Our claim here is that the self-referentiality in Nietzsche’s writing does not primarily affect the question of the nature of language or the problematization of expression but rather the question of the omnipresent self-reference of writing to its material constitution and the meaning that is directly linked to that autodeixis.

We would like to illustrate such a philological reading by looking mainly at page 153 of N VII 2 and calling attention to some features of the sketches there that have a direct effect on the interpretation of its meaning. A starting point can be found on the lower third of the page. The sketch between lines 32–37 can be seen as the completion of a writing process that extends from page 156 to page 153, that is, backward (see fig. 2a/b).

Fig. 2a
The quality of the transcription of the text in previous editions of Nietzsche’s Nachlass can be demonstrated impressively by a direct comparison of this passage with the linear text version of the preceding sentence: crossing out the word “ich” in the third syntactic unit is a further and for this passage crucial “case” of crossing out a “P.” (“person”). The sentence defines an action that not only takes place within itself, in the subsequent sentence. The syntactic unit in the “primary layer” of the next sentence is “Ebenso mit einem fehlenden Kinde—” (“likewise with a missing child—”). However, the second layer reflects directly back onto the previous sentence and its logic.

One might argue that this is only a single case that has no significance beyond being a somewhat deliberate coincidence. However, the logic of writing and its self-reference to the entire passage is far more complex. On the one hand, it is noteworthy that the alternate phrasing also causes a change of perspective: in the primary text layer, the syntactic unit is “warum ich diesen mißbratenen Satz schuf” (“why I created this misbegotten sentence”); in the alternate, overlaid phrasing, the sentence “tilts” into the passive voice: “warum mir dieser Satz mißrieth” (“why this sentence went wrong to me”). Along with the reflection about the written text, an inversion in reference takes place: the sentence is mirroring itself; it “reflects” back on itself.

It is decisive that the self-referential and self-reflexive logic of writing does not remain limited to this sentence but also causes a fundamental change in the subsequent sentence. The syntactic unit in the “primary layer” of the next sentence is “Es gibt [genug] Fälle, wo wir einen M. durchstreicht, weil man...” (“There are [enough] cases where we cross out a P., because you...”). Along with the reflection about the written text, an inversion in reference takes place: the sentence is mirroring itself; it “reflects” back on itself.

The interleaving of the materiality of writing and the meaning of what is said is provoked by the word “durchstreichen” (N VII 2, p. 153, l. 36). The revision of the third syntactic unit, “ich diesen mißbratenen Satz schuf,” by crossing out and the subsequent sketch of an alternate phrasing on top of the primary text layer are discussed by the sentence itself. Furthermore, this discussion is marked and initiated by a word that itself already expresses a tension between form and content, since “durchstreichen” is underlined for emphasis.

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—Es gibt [genug] Fälle, wo wir einen M. durchstreicht, weil man...” (“There are [enough] cases where we cross out a P., because you...”). Along with the reflection about the written text, an inversion in reference takes place: the sentence is mirroring itself; it “reflects” back on itself.

The sentence defines an action that not only takes place within itself, in that the word “Kinde” is crossed out, but also at a key position in the preceding sentence: crossing out the word “ich” in the third syntactic unit is a further and for this passage crucial “case” of crossing out a “P.” (“person”) (“M.” (“Mensch”)).
VIII/1 (see fig. 3): The composition of the text that is referred to as fragment I[42] is such as to prohibit the reenactment of the writing process that we are able to provide through the transcription of Nietzsche's sketch. The distortion is so pervasive that the central semantic value of the sentence (the tension between cross out and underline) is totally obscured by subjecting it to the conventional limitations of printing.

The first result of our philological reading reveals that Nietzsche's writing in this passage is fundamentally characterized by an ongoing reflection on the condition of the possibility of writing itself. What is the relevance of the material constitution of a piece of writing to what is written? What are the criteria of writing? In what way is writing capable of reflecting its own development? Should the logic of writing be considered a call for continued writing or for the revision of what has already been written? Nietzsche's handwritten Nachlass manuscripts generally attest to the complex dialogical writing process these questions imply.

We have far from comprehensively analyzed the self-reflexive references of page 153 of notebook N VII 2, and so we would like to conclude with a closer look at another passage on this same page that is of general relevance to Nietzsche's writing in the Nachlass and its materiality. It concerns the sentence in lines 23–26, which after deletions and insertions to the second level can be reproduced here verbatim:

```
Es ist ein Lieblingswort der Schlaffen und Gewissenlosen
```

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tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner; [...]`
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It is the favorite word of slumbering and unscrupulous people
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tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner; [...]`
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The sentence has a remarkable aspect: the expression "tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" is not signaled to be a foreign expression in the sentence sequence by quotation marks but merely by a change in the writing system from German to Latin script, which was normally only used to indicate a word with a Latin origin or a word from a Romance language. Also, one would expect a colon to precede the French phrase, yet here this punctuation mark follows only after the unquoted phrase. The expression invokes not only a multiplicity of intertexts, since it is not only to be found in an article by Henrich Heine from May 19, 1841, the first known source of the expression, but also in variations in Tolstoy's War and Peace (1868), and by Goethe in Torquato Tasso (1790) and West-Eastern Divan (1819), in Madame de Stael's Corinne ou l'Italie (1807), and in a letter written by Theodor Fontane dated August 18, 1876. However, the local context of the sentence itself is much more relevant than the intertextual references: although the expression is associated with "slumbering" and "unscrupulous" people, it refers to its own author through its integration into the sentence without quotation marks, thereby incorporating him into the circle of the accused.

Again, this is not made transparent in the linear version of KGW VIII, since the distinction between German and Latin script is simply ignored (see fig. 3). Only in the transcription of KGW IX can this central aspect of expression in Nietzsche's writing become visible: the fundamental and omnipresent tension for Nietzsche between self and others, one's own speech and others' speech, the common and the individual, adherence to conventions and innovative transgression, or conformity and singularity, are even represented in his choice of writing system. The tension, which in Nietzsche's sketches already find expression in the choice of script, becomes as a result exponentially complex, since the transcription of KGW IX distinguishes between autograph manuscripts and dictations, and so the tension is replicated on a second level. One has to ask on a case-by-case basis whether a change of script was explicitly ordered by Nietzsche or whether the stenographer was "slavishly" sticking to the conventions of the time. A decision cannot always be reached, and in certain cases both options are equally plausible, so that the particular ramifications of each is worth exploring and developing in detail.

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**Fig. 3**

"WARUM ICH DIESEN MIßBRAUCHENEN SATZ SCHRIFT"
In sum, readers of Nietzsche's Nachlass are exhorted to pay close attention to the complexity of his manuscripts—and that means to remind themselves of the central themes that fundamentally shape Nietzsche's writing: that is, it means to reflect on the condition of possibility of writing in the framework of the written text. The editors of KGW IX have followed this advice and created a new textual basis that enables the readers to do the same.

Notebook W I 3, pages 94 to 95, and the "Will to Power"

If one turns back now to the putative preliminary stage (Vorstufe) of BGE 36 and recalls the importance of self-referentiality and self-reflexivity in Nietzsche's writing, one will quickly see the philosophical relevance of the writing process manifested in this autograph entry for an analysis of the meaning of the "will to power" in Beyond Good and Evil: it will be noticed immediately that in this version, the phrase "will to power" is nowhere to be found (see fig. 1a/b). And that in particular, the famous ending of the notation 38[12] is missing—"This world is the will to power—and nothing else! And you yourselves too are this will to power—and nothing else!" ("Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht—and nichts außerdem! Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht—and nichts außerdem!") (KSA 11:38[12], p. 611).

This alone presents a reading such as Müller-Lauter's with great difficulties, since it claims that on the subject of Nietzsche's "final insights," the Nachlass are often preferable to published versions. Does the fact that the will to power is not mentioned in the manuscript mean, then, that in this case one is not dealing with such an insight and that one also has to read the "will to power" in Beyond Good and Evil on the basis of the clear allusions to "eternal recurrence" that can be found in the draft?

If so, such an attempt would entail a renewed acceptance of the problematic view that one is dealing with a finished text here. But, as the discussion of page 153 of N VII 2 shows, it is just not true that we are dealing with a finished text in the case of Nietzsche's sketches and drafts. Instead of choosing one of the alleged versions over another, it is more reasonable to follow the textual genesis from the earliest drafts to the ultimately published version, which allows us to thereby trace the semantic constants and shifts in the text's reflection and revision process. We would recommend as the starting point for this process the published text or the work containing this text, because only these possess an authorized final textual status in a traditional sense. This approach relies on an understanding of text that has its origins in Aristotle's notion of ergon and that has been picked up by recent German editorial scholars such as Roland Reuß as being an ordered set of written linguistic elements that can be easily read out aloud and that possess a certain unified meaning.27

In the case of an attempt to reconstruct the textual genesis of BGE 36, obviously one also has to incorporate the later adoptions of pages 94 to 95 of notebook W 13, which have recently been transcribed by Beat Röllin. These include sheets 31/32 and 33/34* written by Louise Röder-Wiederhold, as dictated by Nietzsche (which can be found in folder [Mappe, abbreviated Mp] XVI 1) and the genetically only relevant sketch on pages 646 to 647 of KSA 11:40[37] (which now can be found in the transcription of notebook W 17 [KGW IX/4; W 17, p. 57; see fig. 4]), as well as the print manuscript (Druckmanuskript)—that is to say, the handwritten version of the book's text that Nietzsche sent to the editor.28 However, such an approach covers only the paradigmatic levels of meaning and...
textual genesis for the aphorism; given the characteristic contextualization of concepts in Nietzsche's writings, it has to be complemented by a syntagmatic investigation, that is, an analysis of the semantic web arising from the position of the aphorism in the published work.²⁹ Such a reading would have to investigate the meaning of the subjunctives (“Konjunktive”) and other textual elements, which potentially undermine any ontological reading of the aphorism, as well as the position of the aphorism itself within Beyond Good and Evil.³⁰ Such a comprehensive analysis is by far beyond the scope of this article. However, we would at least like to point out the most distinctive characteristics of pages 94 to 95 of notebook W I 3. These include in particular the fact that the entry accords with that very folding into oneself (“in-sich-hinein-Faltung”) qua self-reflection that we have detected in the handwriting of N VII 2. In contrast to that detectable self-reflection, which is incorporated into the writing process itself, the folding inward hinted at on pages 94 to 95 of W I 3 takes place through the complex semantic interplay between the deictic dimensions of the pronoun “this” (“diese”; see fig. 1a/b) and its relation to the intratextual “I” that dominates the entire entry. This can be seen by looking at the beginning and the end of the sketch. By so doing, we can recognize how the leading motif of the “circle” (“Ring”) becomes the central structural feature of the entry itself. The entry starts with the question—“And do you know what the world is to me? Shall I show it to you in the mirror?” (“Und wisst ihr auch, was mir die Welt ist? Soli ich sie euch im Spiegel zeigen?”) (see fig. 1a/b) and already answers the question in the subsequent sentence: “The[is] world: a monster of force, without beginning, without end, a firm, iron quantity of force [. . .]” (“D[e]se Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste ehere Große von Kraft [. . .]”) (see fig. 1a/b). This opening is replayed again in the rhetorical questions at the end of the sketch whereby the circle it traversed is closed. The entry ends as follows: “Do you know now what this world is to me? And what I want when I want this world?” (“Wisst ihr nun, was die Welt ist? Und was ich will, wenn ich diese Welt—will?”) (see fig. 1a/b). The underlining of “I” and “this” particularly ties this question back to the first sentence, which opens with the voice of this very “I” and is followed up by a first description of performative writing—which is also manifested in the intensive reworking of those passages in the middle of the entry that describe the “blessed circle of becoming” (“sehigen Ringes des Werdens”) (see fig. 1a/b)—but also seems to imply a shift in the referentiality of the deictic “this”: “this” ultimately refers only to itself, that is to say to the blueprint of the world outlined in the text, but not to “the world” (our emphasis), as the phrase that appears in the first draft (see fig. 1a/b).

In the version dictated to Louise Röder-Wiederhold, this autoreferential circular structure is reinforced by the fact that Nietzsche puts “the world” from the first sentence of W I 3 on page 94 in quotation marks and underlines “the world” in the penultimate question—“Do you know now what the world is to me?” (“Wisst ihr nun, was mir die Welt ist?”).³¹ Otherwise Nietzsche makes no further changes at either the beginning or the end of the text. There is also nowhere in this dictation an explicit mention of the “will to power.” It can only be found in a later revision of the dictation (cf. Mp XVI, Bl. 32r).³² This revised version ends with the famous “This world is the will to power—and nothing else! And you yourselves too are this will to power—and nothing else!” (“Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht—and nichts außerdem! Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht—and nichts außerdem!”) (Mp XVI, Bl. 32r, transcribed by Beat Röllin, translated by us).³³ According to Röllin, this revision “date[s] to (i) later than the dictations and (ii) because it is written in purple ink, to earlier than the end of September—that is June to mid-September 1885.”³⁴ In the print manuscript these sentences are already in the “subjunctive” mood:


That “this world” of the notebook W I 3 and the revised drafts is to be understood as Nietzsche’s “last insight”—in the sense of a dogmatically fixed ontology—thus appears questionable.

Regardless of whether one follows our rather bold thesis that the nature of the will to power in BGE 36 is purely virtual, the account we have just delivered of the textual genesis should make clear that a determination of its status within Beyond Good and Evil that excludes its constituent textuality can lay no claim to being a comprehensive coverage of the text’s meaning.³⁵ This article should clearly show that treating Nietzsche’s sketches as the equivalent of published texts which leads Müller-Lauter and many others to recklessly combine published and unpublished material in their readings, has to be considered—at least from a philological point of view—as unscientific. An adequate understanding of the interplay of published and unpublished material is only possible if one sticks as closely as possible to the actual manuscripts. In regard to the preliminary stages of Nietzsche’s writing, neither KSA nor any translation that follows this edition allow this proximity to the source. It is only possible by using KGW IX.

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NOTES
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1. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Über Werden und Wille zur Macht: Nietzsche-Interpretationen, vol. 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 35. All translations are ours unless otherwise indicated.
3. Klaus Zittel, “Nachlass 1880–1885” in Nietzsche-Handbuch, ed. Henning Ottmann (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000), 138–39. It is common in German Nietzsche scholarship until the release of KGW IX to call all of Nietzsche’s posthumous writings “posthumous fragments” (“Nachgelassene Fragmente”). Due to the edition, which showed that Nietzsche’s posthumous writings did not only fulfill the requirements for “fragments”—at least in a strict sense—but also could be considered “finished texts,” this term was replaced by “Notat” or “Aufzeichnung.” To underline these characteristics we decided to translate these two terms, which are synonymously used in German scholarship as “sketch.” For the German “Entwurf” we use “draft” and for the word “Notiz” “note.”
4. The edition of KGW IX we reference throughout is Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke, Section IX, Der handschriftliche Nachlaß ab Frühjahr 1885 in differenzi erter Transkription, ed. Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001). All the figures of KGW IX are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.
5. The technical term “diplomatic transcription” is widespread in current editorial scholarship. Paul L. Shillingsburg defines it as follows: “A rendering machine-produced form (typing or typeset) of the entire content of a manuscript, marked proof, or annotated text, including cancellations and additions” (Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998], 174).
7. For a non-German speaker such a reconstruction of the textual genesis of BGE 36 has been almost impossible. Such a reader finds sketch 38[12] as aphorism 1067 of Walter Kaufmann’s translation of The Will to Power. Also the new edition of Nietzsche’s late fragments presents this sketch in a linearized version and does not give any hints about its multiple revisions (Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 38–39). In this edition, the very last sentence of this sketch together with GM II:12 and fragment 14[12] that Nietzsche wrote two years later—in spring 1888 to be precise—even turns into a central document of Bittner’s reading of Nietzsche: “The interesting suggestion here is that to will to power should be understood . . . as a uniform kind of source of whatever happens in the organic world” (introduction to Writings from the Late Notebooks, xx).
8. The problematic philological status of such a reading does not have to be emphasized specifically. For a recent attempt to support Bittner’s reconstruction of Nietzsche’s work plans for the summer of 1885, the two pages form part of the second “layer of inscriptions, written in purple ink” in the notebook, which Nietzsche filled from back to front: “The records on the pages 112/113-86 constitute successively redesigned templates for the middle and late dictations (the so-called Foliotblätter); hence they were written between June and July 1885” (“Die Aufzeichnungen S. 112/113-86 stellen sukzessive neu konzipierte Vorlagen zu den mittleren und späten Diktaten (Foliotblätter) dar; sie entstanden folglich Mitte Juni bis Anfang Juli 1885”) (Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885: Eine Nachlass-Lektüre [Munich: Fink, 2012], 31).
9. This irritating fact was verbally confirmed to Axel Pichler by Beat Rollin, who forms part of the group of philologists currently working on KGW IX in Weimar and Basel.

Since the debate reconstructed here and its practical editorial consequences has received very little attention in anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, we have decided, contrary to common writing conventions, to reproduce the relevant German-speaking contributions verbatim, thereby introducing the reader not familiar with it to the discussion and its communicative practice.

11. The following critique of some of the editorial decisions of the founders of Nietzsche’s complete works is in no way meant to diminish their achievements in and for Nietzsche scholarship. As the following section shows, the problematic editorial principles exposed here are based far more on the state of the art of philological practices at the date of the commencement of the KGW edition than on wrong decisions made by the two editors. Also, all participants of the KGW IX edition tirelessly point out the merits of the two Italian philologists (Beat Röllin et al., “Der späte Nietzsche”—Schreibprozess und Heftedition,” in Schreibtprozesse, ed. Peter Hughes et al. [Munich: Fink, 2008], 103–15). It is also important in this point to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the Kritische Studienausgabe exceeds the KGW in quantity of philological errors.

25. That is to say, we are not pleading for a unique interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts, but—on the contrary—for a methodology of reading that foremost reveals the complexity of their meaning, a complexity of which every interpretation should be beholden.
26. This specific interaction between philosophical thinking and writing does not amount to a rephrasing of a Derridean “undecidability” between philosophy and literature (see Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche-Studien 18 [1989]: 307), nor is it a simple reformulation of an analysis of Nietzsche’s “metaphoric” or “poetic” style. On the one hand, we indeed agree that “Nietzsche’s writings resist paraphrase and they do so in a special way” (Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy as and Literature [New York: Routledge, 1993], 16), and we share the view that the philosophical
topics in Nietzsche are always (co)constituted by (the use of) language itself. On the other hand, we distance ourselves from a simplistic "poststructuralist" point of view by offering a philological method of reading that respects the individuality and (especially) the materiality of the written text, which is typically ignored.

27. See Reuß, "Text, Entwurf, Werk." This point about the linguistic unity of Nietzsche's texts has already been made by Paul van Tongeren from a perspective purely internal to Nietzsche scholarship; see his Reinterpreting Modern Culture: An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2000), 64. As a part of his examination of Nietzsche's writing practices, van Tongeren admits, after having referred to the semantic valence and more complex formation of the published texts in a similar way as Claus Zittel, that the earlier drafts can likewise help illuminate this complexity: "The many sketches and plans we find in his 'unpublished notes' make clear that he did not simply publish his notes as he initially wrote them down, but that he worked on them, rewrote them, changed them, polished them" (68).

Nevertheless for van Tongeren—as for Zittel—the final, that is, published, version remains the text to interpret. For recent German-language scholarship dealing with Nietzsche reading, see Axel Pichler, "Lektürenmethoden der Nietzsche-Forschung," in Nietzsche Online (2011), DOI: 10.1515/NO_W_Themen_0001, www.degruyter.com/db/nietzsche.

28. This print manuscript (Druckmanuskript), which covers 108 sheets and is stored at the archive in Weimar (cf. KSA 71/26), also contains several significant revisions. For example "as real" is added in the first sentence: "Assuming that nothing else is 'given' as real" ("Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real 'gegeben' ist") (BGE 36; KSA 5, p. 54). This addition strengthens the connection between this "nothing else" and the "reality," which appears in quotation marks in the following clause. There are dozens of such deletions and insertions.

29. Herman Siemens and Paul van Tongeren have brought to light that Nietzsche's writing practices are particularly characterized by the creation of a plurality of meanings: "Not only does the meaning of certain words change with the development of his thought; more than most philosophers, he consciously works with the possibility of ascribing different meanings to the same words through differing contextualizations and the deployment of various optics" ("Das Nietzsche-Wörterbuch: Anatomy of a 'großes Projekt,'" in Nietzsche-Macht-Größe, ed. Volker Casaya and Konstanze Schwarzwald [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012], 448). On Nietzsche's practice of contextualization and its consequences for a philologically "adequate" treatment of his texts, see also Werner Stegmaier, "After Montinari: On Nietzsche Philology," in Nietzsche's rejection of any form of metaphysical ontology. Instead of coming up with a final ontological interpretation, Nietzsche's "will to power" fulfills the necessity of justification by offering context-shaped and problem-oriented "virtual ontologies," or, as Werner Stegmaier has called them, case-oriented "counterdoctrines" ("Anti-Lehren," in Also sprach Zarathustra, ed. Volker Gerhardt [Berlin: Akademie, 2000], 191–224). These virtual ontologies identify and assess the prevailing interpretations and thereby form the basis of follow-up revaluations.

For further applications of the way the textuality of Nietzsche's texts informs their meaning, which we have only been able to illustrate in preliminary fashion here, consult the first volume of Wolfram Groddeck's textual genetic edition of the Dionysos-Dithyramben (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991). A genesis of the earlier versions of BGE 36 as well as of the drafts of those earlier versions would need to directly tie into Beat Röllin's reconstruction of Nietzsche's work plans from summer 1885 and ultimately would probably not be less voluminous than Röllin's excellent philological study. In this respect, the sketch given here is only to be understood as a first step toward an adequate dealing with earlier versions of later published texts.